Of course, now I’m old and smart, and I know that “hope springs eternal” are the first three words in Alexander Pope’s poem, An Essay on Man.  The poem was written in 1733, before baseball was even invented.  Although to hear some Cubs fans, you’d think that was the same year the Cubs started training in Mesa.  But I digress.

Despite the fact that I now know the origin of the phrase, I can’t help but associate it with Spring Training.  After all, at the beginning of Spring Training, all team’s are tied for first and fans from each team have reason to hope that this is the year their boys of summer will bring home the prize.  Well, at least that’s how it’s supposed to be.

The truth is that fans for several teams know that their teams don’t stand a chance of making the post-season, let alone win a World Series championship.    That’s not how it’s supposed to be in professional sports.  The rules of the sport are supposed to make the playing field even — or as even as possible — for all teams.  In this respect, baseball fails miserably.

Once again in 2010, the team with the highest payroll (Yankees) will outspend the team with the lowest payroll (Pirates) by more that five times.  Not only does that not create an even playing field, but it creates a situation where the lowest payroll team has absolutely no chance of competing.  Under baseball’s current rules, the Pirates are simply fodder used to fill out the schedule.

And the Pirates are not alone.  They are joined at the bottom of the payroll ladder by the Nationals, Rangers, Athletics, Marlins, and Padres.  All teams that have very little chance of posting a winning record and virtually no chance of making the post-season.

I can hear the naysayers now saying that the Rangers were competitive in the weak AL West just last year.  That’s true, but the AL West is better this year and the Rangers will likely not be as good. 

The naysayers also point to the Marlins who, despite league leading low payrolls have won two World Series titles since 1997.  Again, true, but the Marlins are the exception.  If it takes a miracle for a team to rise to the top, then the playing field probably isn’t very level.

Many fans point to the Yankees for outspending every other team.  I am not a Yankee basher, at least not in this context.  Baseball is flush with money.  At a time when other sports are seeing their revenues decrease (some substantially), baseball actually saw an increase in revenue in 2009.  Attendance was down, but revenue was up.  In fact, according to Maury Brown at The Biz of Baseball,  MLB’s revenues hit a record $6.6 billion in 2009.

That means that teams have more revenue sharing money coming in for the 2010 season.  Even so, teams at the bottom of the payroll ladder continue to spend less on payroll than they receive in revenue sharing.

At one time, I was in favor of a salary cap for MLB that included a minimum amount team’s had to spend on payroll.  I was never completely comfortable with the idea of a salary cap, but I couldn’t think of any other way to even the playing field.

Then last November, I ran across a column by Jayson Stark of ESPN.com in which he did a fantastic job of explaining the problem and offering a solution.  In his article, Stark pointed out that as many as 10 teams (one-third of all MLB teams) receive more in revenue sharing and TV/radio rights (local and national) than they spend on payroll.  (That figure is up to 13 of the 30 teams based on 2010 projected payroll figures)

In my original post on this subject, I explained Stark’s solution to the problem like this:

Stark then offers a solution than I like much better than my original salary cap solution.  Stark suggests that MLB continue to tax the highest spending teams just as they do now, but also start taxing the lowest spending teams.  Set payroll parameters that discourage the wealthiest teams from spending their competitors into oblivion, but which also encourage the “poorest” teams to spend the money they receive from the central fund, revenue sharing, and local TV rights to improve their teams and to compete on the field.

As Stark points out, this proposal will not cure all of MLB’s ills, but it will improve competitive balance and the play on the field.  And once competitive balance is established, many of MLB’s problems will seem much less important.

For years, the NFL has bragged about the parity they have been able to achieve.  On any given Sunday, any one team can beat any other team in the NFL.  Not so in MLB.  Every year, there are teams that don’t stand a chance of being competitive, let alone have hopes for the post-season.  Instead of creating parity, MLB has created a parody of what a competitive, well-run league should look like. 

For fans of two-thirds of the teams in MLB, hope springs eternal again this year.  Some teams may be long shots, but at least they stand a chance.  Not so for the other one-third of teams.  Before the season even gets started, they are out of the running.  For fans of those teams, “hope springs eternal” doesn’t hold any special meaning.  It’s simply a line from a poem.

The real sin in all of this is that many teams are making more money from TV/radio rights and revenue sharing than they are spending on their payroll.  How can MLB allow team owners to do this?  It’s baseball’s dirty little secret, but at the moment, it’s not a very well kept secret.

Uber-agent Scott Boras recently made some comments that stirred the pot.  He claimed that there are teams receiving $80 – $90 million “before they ever sell a ticket” who are only spending $40 – $50 million on payroll.  To Boras, this is wrong and is a slap in the face of the fans who follow the team.

MLB was quick to respond.  MLB Executive Vice President Rob Manfred issued a statement dismissing Boras’ claims and indicating that the numbers he used ‘have no basis in reality.”  However, it seemed to me that Manfred purposely didn’t respond to the specific allegations Boras made.

In any case, Jayson Stark of ESPN.com took up the case and came to some interesting conclusions.

“If you live in Pittsburgh or South Florida, you’ve probably gotten so used to blaming The System for all your team’s problems, there’s an excellent chance you never noticed something every fan of these two “small-market” operations should know:

“Your team collected more money this season — before it ever sold one ticket — than it spent on its entire major league payroll. In fact, it collected more than it spent on its major league payroll and its player-development system combined.

“But it isn’t just the Pirates and Marlins who are cashing checks larger than their payrolls before the ticket offices open. By some estimates, a third of the teams in the sport are doing exactly the same thing.”

One-third all all teams spend less on payroll than they receive from TV/radio rights (local and national) and revenue sharing?  That seems impossible, but Stark backs up the contention.

According to Starks figures, which he gleaned from sources throughout MLB, each team receives a check from the central fund (which includes national TV rights, radio, Internet, licensing, merchandising, marketing, MLB International Money) totaling $40 million.  Every team also gets a check for revenue sharing, although the amount varies by team.  According to Stark, the five neediest teams get $35 million each, but no one apparently gets less than $20 million.  Local TV money varies, but all but one team makes at least $15 million per year from local TV rights and the other team makes at least $12 million per year.

According to Stark, the neediest teams in the game get at least $90 million before they sell a ticket.  He then subtracts $10 million from that amount for pension and operation fees, leaving $80 million.   Then Stark says:

“OK, now let’s head back to the payroll list. We count a minimum of a dozen teams, depending on how you define “total payroll,” that aren’t spending that same number — $80 million — on their major league payroll. So it isn’t just Scott Boras who has the right to ask: What’s up with that?”

Rob Manfred doesn’t dispute the figures, but says that the meaning of the figures has been misunderstood.

“When you evaluate a baseball team,” Manfred said, “you need to understand that these teams have expenses in addition to the 25-man roster on the field. They have multimillion-dollar benefit costs. They have the cost of paying 15 players on the [40-man] major league roster who are not in the big leagues.

“They have the cost of their player-development system, which averages $15 million [per team] a year. They have the cost of acquiring [amateur] players through the [June] draft and internationally, which averages $9 million [per team] a year. So for anybody to take a club’s revenues and say that 60 percent should go to major league payroll, that’s just a fundamental misunderstanding of this business.”

As Stark then correctly points out, MLB teams have many other income streams that are not included in these figures.  If you are going to list all of the expenses an MLB team has, you have to then also include all sources of revenue, including ticket sales, concessions, parking, sponsorships, souvenir sales, etc.

Stark then offers a solution than I like much better than my original salary cap solution.  Stark suggests that MLB continue to tax the highest spending teams just as they do now, but also start taxing the lowest spending teams.  Set payroll parameters that discourage the wealthiest teams from spending their competitors into oblivion, but which also encourage the “poorest” teams to spend the money they receive from the central fund, revenue sharing, and local TV rights to improve their teams and to compete on the field. 

I never liked the idea of a salary cap, but I didn’t see another way to make baseball more competitive and to level the playing field between the highest and lowest revenue teams.  Stark’s proposal accomplishes this without resorting to a salary cap.  Brilliant!

As Stark points out, this proposal will not cure all of MLB’s ills, but it will improve competitive balance and the play on the field.  And once competitive balance is established, many of MLB’s problems will seem much less important.

Rich Harden didn’t look bad, pitching 6.0 innings and giving up four hits, including a homerun to Scott Rolen in his first at-bat since being beaned last week.  Harden gave up a total of three earned runs, while striking out nine and walking four.

Of the four hits mustered by the Cubs, Harden had the only extra base hit, a non-consequential double.  Alfonso Soriano had one of the other Cubs hits, but he was summarily picked-off first base to take away any threat he posed.

The Cubs will enjoy a day off today as they travel to Colorado for a three game set against the Rockies.  Carlos Zambrano (7-4) will kick things off on Friday against the Rockies Ubaldo Jimenez (8-9).

**********

The Cubs released BJ Ryan yesterday.  According to a tweet on Twitter from Gordon Wittenmyer, Ryan asked for his release because he didn’t think his velocity was coming back.

This situation seems strange to me.  Ryan was released from Toronto because his velocity was down and he wasn’t nearly as effective as he had been in previous years.  Toronto worked with him on his mechanics, but things didn’t work out. 

The Cubs took a flyer on Ryan and he reported to Mesa with a ton of enthusiasm to work hard and get his mechanics right.  Cubs officials stated that they were impressed that Ryan wanted to “do things the right way,” meaning he was willing to be patient and to work hard to solve his mechanical flaws.  Once in Mesa, a Cubs official (it may have been Randy Bush) said that Ryan’s problems were more mental than mechanical, making it sound like they could get him straightened out more quickly that first expected.

Ryan quickly made his way to AAA Iowa where he was pitching very well over the course of a week or two.  Rumors were flying that he was on the fast track to join the Cubs in August.  Then out of the blue, he asks for his release.

I don’t know what is going on behind the scenes nor do I know what motivation Ryan may have had for asking for his release, but the whole thing seems odd to me.  Does Ryan have another opportunity he wants to pursue?  Did the Cubs find out something negative about Ryan (Physical problem?  Steroids?).  I don’t know, but it seems like there’s more to the story than we know right now.

**********

I’ve been critical of JP Ricciardi for not dealing Roy Halladay at the trade deadline.  I felt he was asking too steep of a price for Halladay, he deluded himself when teams weren’t willing to pay his price, and he further deluded himself by believing that teams will pay even more for Halladay in the off season.  Jon Heyman of Sports Illustrated has chimed in with his thoughts, and it sounds like we generally agree.

In a nutshell, Heyman blames Ricciardi for talking too much about the trade and being too candid.  For instance, it certainly didn’t help Ricciardi’s negotiating position by publicly staing that the Yankees and Red Sox would have to pay more for Halladay that out-of-division teams.  Not only did it let both the Yankees and Red Sox know that they didn’t have to worry about the other obtaining Halladay, but it also let Philadelphia and other out-of-division teams know that the Yankees and Red Sox would not be serious competition for Halladay.

Heyman is also critical of Ricciardi for not being more creative in his negotiations.  According to Heyman, Ricciardi should have made an effort to package Halladay with either Vernon Wells or Alex Rios in an attempt to move a big contract that is hampering Toronto’s efforts to rebuild and contend.  I had mentioned the possibility of packaging Wells and Halladay in a previous post and I still think it would have been a good idea for Toronto.  True, adding Wells or Rios to the deal may have reduced the return the Blue Jays would have gotten for Halladay alone, but it would have created much needed payroll flexibility for Toronto.

In a radio interview, ESPN’s Jayson Stark was asked if Riccardi’s failure to move Halladay might lead to his firing.  Stark responded that he didn’t think Ricciardi would be fired because he didn’t move Haladay.  Instead, he thinks Ricciardi was already on the hot seat, and Toronto management may have wanted Ricciardi to trade Halladay so the new GM wouldn’t have to.  Now, he can see a situation where Ricciardi is fired and the first order of business for the new GM will be to trade Halladay. If that happens, the new GM will almost certainly get less for Halladay than Ricciardi was shooting for, making the new GM look weak in comparison.  Not a good way to start a new job.