The bad news will take a little longer to explain.  Let’s start by pointing out that the Pittsburgh Pirates have not had a winning season in their last 18 seasons.  They are one of the most poorly run franchises in all of baseball.  And despite the fact that they say they have a plan for the future, the truth is that they don’t have a plan.  Or more accurately, they do have a plan, but it’s not the plan they say they have.  Let me explain.

Pittsburgh claims that they can not compete by spending money on their big league team.  So they spend less on their big league payroll than they receive in revenue sharing money.  They also routinely trade away their most promising players because they claim they can’t afford them after a few years.  The Pirates claim that their plan is to trade their best players for prospects, and they will build their franchise on less expensive prospects.  However, this plan doesn’t make sense.  As prospects develop, they become more expensive.  They get paid more through arbitration the better they play.  And when they get better, the Pirates trade away these players for prospects, and the wheel continues to turn.  That is the real plan the Pirates are following.  Their plan is to keep their payroll low, keep losing, and continue to pocket the money the team receives in revenue sharing.  It wouldn’t be a popular plan if they were honest about it, so they claim they have a completely different plan. 

So, the Pirates are poorly run, perpetual losers, and they routinely are among the teams with the lowest payroll.  In 2010, they have the league’s absolute lowest payroll.  To give you an idea of how low Pittsburgh’s payroll is, let’s compare it to the Cubs payroll.  Both teams are in the NL Central, yet the Cubs out spend the Pirates by more than $100 million.  The Cubs 2010 payroll is $146 million.  The Pirates spend a cool $35 million.

Despite the difference in their payrolls, yesterday’s victory by the Cubs was just the first win the Cubs have earned in six tries this year against the Pirates.  In fact, with a record of 16-22 on the season, the Cubs find themselves in 4th place in the NL Central behind the Reds, Cardinals, and the pathetic Pittsburgh Pirates.

I find this fact absolutely amazing.  How is it possible that entering yesterday’s game, the Pirates had beaten the Cubs in five straight games?  How is it possible that midway through May, the Cubs are trailing the hapless Pirates in the standings?  How is it that a team like the Pirates that spend less than 25% as much on payroll as the Cubs do can so thoroughly outplay them?

I don’t have answers to any of these questions.  I am just stunned by the fact that, despite how poorly the Pirates are run and how little they spend on player payroll, they have made the Cubs look sick all season.

Maybe we’re getting to the point where we have to accept that the Cubs are just not a good baseball team.  While the Cubs have five everyday players who are hitting over .300 (plus Starlin Castro who is hitting .323), they still have trouble scoring runs.  This is due in large part to the fact that Derrek Lee just raised his batting average to .238 and Aramis Ramirez is stuck below the Mendoza line at .167.  Despite these anemic numbers, Lee and Ramirez continue to bat third and fourth respectively in the lineup.

Rob G. at The Cubs Reporter did an interesting study in which he found that as of this past Thursday, Ramirez and Lee lead the Cubs in runners left on base this season.  In 141 plate appearances, Ramirez has left 104 runners on base.  Lee has come to the plate 154 times and has left 103 runners on base. 

How long should Lou Piniella allow Lee and Ramirez to continue to bat in the middle of the lineup?  I understand allowing a guy to try to work his way out of a slump, but how long can the Cubs afford to wait?  Perhaps Lee has turned a corner.  He is hitting a bit better as of late.  However, Ramirez has just been horrible.  He claims that he is healthy, but he does not look good at the plate.

We’re only a month-and-a-half into the season, but it’s already been a long year for the Cubs.  Losing five-out-of-six so far to the Pirates this year is just one symptom of the problem, albeit a horribly embarrassing symptom.  Trailing the Pirates in the standings should be enough to light a fire under the Cubs.  Unfortunately, nothing has been able to light that fire so far this year.  And that really is bad news.

The Cubs will now move on to Cincinnati to take on the Reds in a three game weekend series.  I’ll be heading to Cincy too.  I have tickets to Sunday’s game.  Ryan Dempster will take the hill for the Cubs.  He will face-off against Cincinnati’s impressive rookie pitcher Mike Leake.

My sincerest hope is that the tickets to the game arrive in the mail today.  I previously chronicled the horrible service I received  when ordering the tickets from the Reds, so I wouldn’t be surprised if they forgot to send the tickets.  Even so, I don’t want to have to call them to figure this out. 

Next week, I’ll provide all of the details of my visit to Cincinnati.  Hopefully, I’ll also have news of a Cubs three-game sweep.

Of course, now I’m old and smart, and I know that “hope springs eternal” are the first three words in Alexander Pope’s poem, An Essay on Man.  The poem was written in 1733, before baseball was even invented.  Although to hear some Cubs fans, you’d think that was the same year the Cubs started training in Mesa.  But I digress.

Despite the fact that I now know the origin of the phrase, I can’t help but associate it with Spring Training.  After all, at the beginning of Spring Training, all team’s are tied for first and fans from each team have reason to hope that this is the year their boys of summer will bring home the prize.  Well, at least that’s how it’s supposed to be.

The truth is that fans for several teams know that their teams don’t stand a chance of making the post-season, let alone win a World Series championship.    That’s not how it’s supposed to be in professional sports.  The rules of the sport are supposed to make the playing field even — or as even as possible — for all teams.  In this respect, baseball fails miserably.

Once again in 2010, the team with the highest payroll (Yankees) will outspend the team with the lowest payroll (Pirates) by more that five times.  Not only does that not create an even playing field, but it creates a situation where the lowest payroll team has absolutely no chance of competing.  Under baseball’s current rules, the Pirates are simply fodder used to fill out the schedule.

And the Pirates are not alone.  They are joined at the bottom of the payroll ladder by the Nationals, Rangers, Athletics, Marlins, and Padres.  All teams that have very little chance of posting a winning record and virtually no chance of making the post-season.

I can hear the naysayers now saying that the Rangers were competitive in the weak AL West just last year.  That’s true, but the AL West is better this year and the Rangers will likely not be as good. 

The naysayers also point to the Marlins who, despite league leading low payrolls have won two World Series titles since 1997.  Again, true, but the Marlins are the exception.  If it takes a miracle for a team to rise to the top, then the playing field probably isn’t very level.

Many fans point to the Yankees for outspending every other team.  I am not a Yankee basher, at least not in this context.  Baseball is flush with money.  At a time when other sports are seeing their revenues decrease (some substantially), baseball actually saw an increase in revenue in 2009.  Attendance was down, but revenue was up.  In fact, according to Maury Brown at The Biz of Baseball,  MLB’s revenues hit a record $6.6 billion in 2009.

That means that teams have more revenue sharing money coming in for the 2010 season.  Even so, teams at the bottom of the payroll ladder continue to spend less on payroll than they receive in revenue sharing.

At one time, I was in favor of a salary cap for MLB that included a minimum amount team’s had to spend on payroll.  I was never completely comfortable with the idea of a salary cap, but I couldn’t think of any other way to even the playing field.

Then last November, I ran across a column by Jayson Stark of ESPN.com in which he did a fantastic job of explaining the problem and offering a solution.  In his article, Stark pointed out that as many as 10 teams (one-third of all MLB teams) receive more in revenue sharing and TV/radio rights (local and national) than they spend on payroll.  (That figure is up to 13 of the 30 teams based on 2010 projected payroll figures)

In my original post on this subject, I explained Stark’s solution to the problem like this:

Stark then offers a solution than I like much better than my original salary cap solution.  Stark suggests that MLB continue to tax the highest spending teams just as they do now, but also start taxing the lowest spending teams.  Set payroll parameters that discourage the wealthiest teams from spending their competitors into oblivion, but which also encourage the “poorest” teams to spend the money they receive from the central fund, revenue sharing, and local TV rights to improve their teams and to compete on the field.

As Stark points out, this proposal will not cure all of MLB’s ills, but it will improve competitive balance and the play on the field.  And once competitive balance is established, many of MLB’s problems will seem much less important.

For years, the NFL has bragged about the parity they have been able to achieve.  On any given Sunday, any one team can beat any other team in the NFL.  Not so in MLB.  Every year, there are teams that don’t stand a chance of being competitive, let alone have hopes for the post-season.  Instead of creating parity, MLB has created a parody of what a competitive, well-run league should look like. 

For fans of two-thirds of the teams in MLB, hope springs eternal again this year.  Some teams may be long shots, but at least they stand a chance.  Not so for the other one-third of teams.  Before the season even gets started, they are out of the running.  For fans of those teams, “hope springs eternal” doesn’t hold any special meaning.  It’s simply a line from a poem.

Trade Candidates

Melky Cabrera — After trading for Curtis Granderson, the Yankees suddenly have a surplus of good, young outfielders.  They may be interested in trading either Cabrera or Brett Gardner.  If the Cubs could snag Cabrera, they would be getting a guy that hit .274/.336/.416 for the Yankees in 2009 with 13 homeruns and 68 RBI.   The switch hitting Cabrera is just 25-years old and earned $1.4 million in 2009.  As a fielder, UZR/150 says he’s just slightly above average, posting a rating of 2.3.  UPDATE: Cabrera has been traded to the Braves, so he’s now off the board.

Shin-Soo Choo — Choo is a 27-year old outfielder from Korea.  Last year with the Indians, Choo hit .300/.394/.489 with 20 homeruns and 86 RBI.  He also had 21 stolen bases and was caught just twice.  It was the best year of his major league career.  He is currently listed as the Indians starting right fielder, but Matt LaPorte is breathing down his neck and Cleveland may be interested in trading him.  Choo has only played a handful of games in center field, but he’s been an above-average left fielder in his career and an average right fielder, so I’m assuming he can handle center field.  Choo earned $420,300 in 2009 and is likely due for a raise.

Rajai Davis — The Oakland A’s are stock full of outfielders, potentially making Rajai Davis available.  Davis hit .305/.360/.423 with  3 homeruns and 48 RBI in 390 ABs.  he also had 41 stolen bases and was caught stealing 12 times.  UZR/150 likes Davis, giving him a 17.8 rating in center field in 2009.  The 29-year old davis (he’s not a kid) earned $410,000 in 2009 and will likely be in line for an increase in 2010.  Jim Hendry and Billy Beane have worked well together on deals in the past.  Might the get together this off season on Davis? 

Jacoby Ellsbury — Ellsbury could be the odd man out in Boston now that the Red Sox have signed center fielder Mike Cameron.  It’s unclear where Ellsbury will end up playing or even if he’ll be starting.  In 2009, Ellsbury hit .301/.355/.415 with 8 homeruns and 60 RBI.  He also stole an impressive 70 bases while getting caught just 12 times.  He’d look good at the top of the Cubs batting order.  Ellsbury gets gigged for his 2009 UZR/150 rating of  -18.3, but I’m not buying it.  Chris Moore at BaseballAnalysts.com took a look at Ellsbury’s defense and concluded that UZR/150 probably missed the boat.  Ellsbury is just 26-years old and could fill center field for the Cubs for years to come.  And at just $449,500 per year (his 2009 salary), he’s a bargain.

Dexter Fowler — Fowler is a good looking young ballplayer (I sound like Harry Caray) who hit .266/.363/.406 with 4 homeruns and 34 RBI in 2009 for Colorado.  He’s just 23-years old and is coming off his rookie season with a lot of promise.  UZR/150 didn’t like his fielding much, giving him just a -20.3 rating.  Fowler is currently blocked in center field in Colorado by Carlos Gonzalez, another promising youngster.  There’s no guarantee that Fowler is going to follow up his rookie campaign by continuing to develop, but I think it would be a fairly safe risk for the Cubs, especially considering that he is so inexpensive (he earned just $401,000 2009).

Brett Gardner — Who would you take from the Yankees, Melky Cabrera or Brett Gardner?  In 2009, Gardner hit .270/.345/.379 with 3 homeruns, 23 RBI and 26 stolen bases in 248 ABs.  He’s a terrific center fielder with a career UZR/150 rating of 27.6.  In a crowded Yankees line-up, it’s tough to say who will be the odd-man out, but it appears to be either Cabrera or Gardner.  Could Gardner be the Cubs center fielder of 2010 and beyond?

Gary Matthews, Jr — The Angels badly want to trade Matthews.  Here’s what the Cubs should consider:  He’s not much of a hitter anymore, he’s not a very good fielder anymore, and he’s very expensive.  Need I say more?

Nyjer Morgan — Washington acquired Morgan last year from Pittsburgh.  He put together a good year between the two teams, posting a hitting line of .307/.369/.388 with 3 homeruns and 39 RBI.  He also stole 42 bases in 2009.  Unfortunately for Morgan, he was stealing third base on August 28 against the Cubs when he broke his hand and missed the remainder of the season.  In 2009, Morgan posted an impressive 40.5 UZR/150 rating.  Not only could he handle center field at Wrigley, but he could also be the lead-off hitter that the Cubs sorely need.  But why would Washington trade him?  Good question.  Unfortunately, at this moment, I don’t have a good answer.  At 29-years old, Morgan is a bit of a late bloomer.  He made just $411,500 in 2009 and is going to be affordable for some time to come.

Cody Ross — Ross is not a kid like a lot of the people on this list.  He’s 29-years old (that’s not that old) and is a bit more of a known quantity than some of the other trade candidates.  What we know is that he hit .270/.321/.484 with 24 homeruns and 90 RBI in 2009 for Florida.  We also know that 2009 was the best year of Ross’ career.  But to be fair, Ross has been coming on strong since 2007.  He primarily plays center field, although he also spent time in right field and is currently listed as the Marlins starting right fielder.  In center field, Ross had a UZR/150 rating of -9.5 in 2009.  Ross earned $2.225 million in 2009 and accepted arbitration for 2010.

Aaron Rowand — San Francisco would like to move Rowand’s contract.  In 2009, the 32-year old center fielder hit .261/.319/.419 with 15 homeruns and 64 RBI.  He had a 1.5 UZR/150 rating and he earned $8 million on a contract that runs through 2012.  He is still owed $36 million.  The Cubs don’t need to bring in an aging outfielder who is on the down-side of his career and making a lot of money.  Although I like Aaron Rowand, I don’t think he is the answer in center field.

Grady Sizemore — To be honest, I don’t think the Indians have any interest in trading Sizemore, but I saw him on another list, so I thought I’d include him.  In 2009, Sizemore hit .248/.338/.445 with 18 homeruns and 64 RBI in what by Sizemore standards was a down year.  Sizemore is signed through 2011 and is owed $13.1 million.  His contract also includes an $8.5 million option in 2012 with a $500,000 buyout.  Sizemore had a -4.0 UZR/150 rating in 2009, but he has a career UZR/150 of 5.4.  I don’t think it matters.  He’s not going anywhere.

Denard Span — Would Minnesota be willing to trade Denard Span?  If so, the Cubs need to get to the front of the line.  In 2009,  the 25-year old Span hit .311/.392/.432 with 8 homeruns and 68 RBI.  And he did it for a cheap $435,000.  UZR/150 gave him a fielding rating of -7.4, but from everything I’ve read, he does a fine job in center field.  He has emerged as one of the top lead-off hitters in baseball and would be a good long-term investment for the Cubs.

Willy Taveras — I’m pretty sure that the Cubs could convince the Reds to trade Taveras for a couple of prospects.  Cincinnati badly needs to cut payroll and the weak hitting Taveras is owed $4 million in 2010.  Trading for Taveras would not be a good move.

Vernon Wells — Okay, I don’t think the Cubs should trade for him and his monster contract either, but I thought he should be listed anyway because he’s available.  I don’t know if you’ve heard, but Wells makes a lot of money.

Chris Young — Young is a 26-year old center fielder for Arizona.  He hit .212/.311/.400 in 2009 with 15 homeruns and 42 RBI.  His UZR/150 rating for 2009 was -9.8.  I’m not as high on Young as some people are.  I do think he has potential, but I’m not convinced he’s ever going to realize that potential.  He’s signed through 2013 and is owed $26.25 million over the next four years.  The contract also includes a club option for 2014 for $11 million with a $1.5 million buyout.  Although I included him in this list, my hope is that the Cubs don’t pursue him.

Eric Young, Jr. – The 24-year old Young is an interesting player for the Cubs.  He plays both second base and center field (just like his dad).  As it turns out, the Cubs need to fill both positions.  At the moment, Young is a reserve for Colorado, but he appears to be ready for prime time.  He only played in 30 games in 2009, and is eligible for Rookie of the Year in 2010.   Trading for Young would be a bit of a risk.  Does he have what it takes to be an all-star caliber big leaguer?

The real sin in all of this is that many teams are making more money from TV/radio rights and revenue sharing than they are spending on their payroll.  How can MLB allow team owners to do this?  It’s baseball’s dirty little secret, but at the moment, it’s not a very well kept secret.

Uber-agent Scott Boras recently made some comments that stirred the pot.  He claimed that there are teams receiving $80 – $90 million “before they ever sell a ticket” who are only spending $40 – $50 million on payroll.  To Boras, this is wrong and is a slap in the face of the fans who follow the team.

MLB was quick to respond.  MLB Executive Vice President Rob Manfred issued a statement dismissing Boras’ claims and indicating that the numbers he used ‘have no basis in reality.”  However, it seemed to me that Manfred purposely didn’t respond to the specific allegations Boras made.

In any case, Jayson Stark of ESPN.com took up the case and came to some interesting conclusions.

“If you live in Pittsburgh or South Florida, you’ve probably gotten so used to blaming The System for all your team’s problems, there’s an excellent chance you never noticed something every fan of these two “small-market” operations should know:

“Your team collected more money this season — before it ever sold one ticket — than it spent on its entire major league payroll. In fact, it collected more than it spent on its major league payroll and its player-development system combined.

“But it isn’t just the Pirates and Marlins who are cashing checks larger than their payrolls before the ticket offices open. By some estimates, a third of the teams in the sport are doing exactly the same thing.”

One-third all all teams spend less on payroll than they receive from TV/radio rights (local and national) and revenue sharing?  That seems impossible, but Stark backs up the contention.

According to Starks figures, which he gleaned from sources throughout MLB, each team receives a check from the central fund (which includes national TV rights, radio, Internet, licensing, merchandising, marketing, MLB International Money) totaling $40 million.  Every team also gets a check for revenue sharing, although the amount varies by team.  According to Stark, the five neediest teams get $35 million each, but no one apparently gets less than $20 million.  Local TV money varies, but all but one team makes at least $15 million per year from local TV rights and the other team makes at least $12 million per year.

According to Stark, the neediest teams in the game get at least $90 million before they sell a ticket.  He then subtracts $10 million from that amount for pension and operation fees, leaving $80 million.   Then Stark says:

“OK, now let’s head back to the payroll list. We count a minimum of a dozen teams, depending on how you define “total payroll,” that aren’t spending that same number — $80 million — on their major league payroll. So it isn’t just Scott Boras who has the right to ask: What’s up with that?”

Rob Manfred doesn’t dispute the figures, but says that the meaning of the figures has been misunderstood.

“When you evaluate a baseball team,” Manfred said, “you need to understand that these teams have expenses in addition to the 25-man roster on the field. They have multimillion-dollar benefit costs. They have the cost of paying 15 players on the [40-man] major league roster who are not in the big leagues.

“They have the cost of their player-development system, which averages $15 million [per team] a year. They have the cost of acquiring [amateur] players through the [June] draft and internationally, which averages $9 million [per team] a year. So for anybody to take a club’s revenues and say that 60 percent should go to major league payroll, that’s just a fundamental misunderstanding of this business.”

As Stark then correctly points out, MLB teams have many other income streams that are not included in these figures.  If you are going to list all of the expenses an MLB team has, you have to then also include all sources of revenue, including ticket sales, concessions, parking, sponsorships, souvenir sales, etc.

Stark then offers a solution than I like much better than my original salary cap solution.  Stark suggests that MLB continue to tax the highest spending teams just as they do now, but also start taxing the lowest spending teams.  Set payroll parameters that discourage the wealthiest teams from spending their competitors into oblivion, but which also encourage the “poorest” teams to spend the money they receive from the central fund, revenue sharing, and local TV rights to improve their teams and to compete on the field. 

I never liked the idea of a salary cap, but I didn’t see another way to make baseball more competitive and to level the playing field between the highest and lowest revenue teams.  Stark’s proposal accomplishes this without resorting to a salary cap.  Brilliant!

As Stark points out, this proposal will not cure all of MLB’s ills, but it will improve competitive balance and the play on the field.  And once competitive balance is established, many of MLB’s problems will seem much less important.

I was reminded of the need for a salary cap again today when I was reading a rather innocuous post on MLBTradeRumors.com.  In essense, the post said that the Pirates are looking to add one or two low-cost free agents, but again this off season, they won’t be a player for any big name free agents.  The same is likely true for the Marlins, Twins, Rays, Royals and Padres, and maybe a few other teams as well.

Imagine if you were a fan of the Pirates (or any of the other teams listed).  Every off season, you get to watch other more well-healed teams compete for big name free agents — the type of player that can make a huge difference for a team — while your team quietly sits on the sideline waiting to possibly scoop up the leftovers.  It must be a hopeless feeling.

Once the off season is over and the season is about to begin, the hopeless feeling you had in the off season is doubled because you know that your favorite team has virtually no chance of competing.  For the Pirates, their only hope for the 2010 season is that they might be able to finish ahead of the Reds in the standings, especially since the Reds are under pressure to cut payroll and will likely field a worse team in 2010 than they did in 2009.

Honestly, why would any sport want to run a league in a way that allows a team in it’s largest market to outspend a small market team like the Pirates by a factor of five-to-one?  Money may not buy championships, but it sure makes it a lot easier.

The Yankees payroll allows them to put an all-star at almost every position.  And when one player underperforms, they go out in the off season and sign a free agent to replace them or trade with a lesser-payroll team to get the best player at that position.  They are constantly reloading.  I’m not a Yankees fan nor am I privy to the philosophy of their front office, but I have to believe that the Yankees (and to a lesser extent the Red Sox) view the rest of Major League Baseball as an extension of their minor league sytstem.  When they need a player, if he’s not in their farm system, they can just go to Cleveland, or Florida, or Pittsburgh and trade for the player they need.

I don’t want this post to sound like a slam against the Yankees.  I don’t blame the Yankees in the least for the competitive imbalance that exists in baseball today.  The Yankees are simply playing by the rules and doing it well.  The Yankees are not the problem, the system is the problem.

Joe Posnanski of Sports Illustrated wrote a terrific article recently highlighting the inequities in baseball.  Posnanski writes that everyone knows the Yankees outspend every other team, but they may not fully comprehend how bad the problem really is.

“This is much starker than people think, by the way. I quickly went back and looked at the numbers before writing my column for SI.com, and I’m going to reprint them here because even as someone who has also grown sick of hearing about the Yankees payroll, I found them to be stunning:

In 2002, the Yankees spent $17 million more in payroll than any other team.

In 2003, the Yankees spent $35 million more in payroll than any other team.

In 2004, the Yankees spent $57 million more in payroll than any other team. I mean, it’s ridiculous from the start but this is pure absurdity. Basically, this is like the Yankees saying: “OK, let’s spend exactly as much as the second-highest payroll in baseball. OK, we’re spending exactly as much. And now … let’s add the Oakland A’s. No, I mean let’s add their whole team, the whole payroll, add it on top and let’s play some ball!”

In 2005, the Yankees spent $85 million more than any other team. Not a misprint. Eight five.

In 2006, the Yankees spent $74 million more than any other team.

In 2007, the Yankees spent $40 million more than any other team — cutbacks, you know.

In 2008, the Yankees spent $72 million more than any other team.

In 2009, the Yankees spent $52 million more than any other team…

So how can the commissioner of baseball promote such nonsense as Hope on Opening Day when the game is set up for one team to spend tens of millions more than anyone else?”

Missing out on Iwamura is not a big blow to the Cubs.  He would have been a good fit, but there are other options.  The thing I don’t understand is why Pittsburgh was so hot-to-trot to get Iwamura.  He’s a nice player, but he’s 31 years old, is only signed for one more year, and will cost the Bucs $4.85 million.  The Pirates are a self-confessed “team in rebuild mode” with a plan for the future to build around prospects and the farm system.  So how does Iwamura fit into that plan?

To make matters worse, Pittsburgh gave up Jesse Chavez, a 26-year old who just completed his rookie year by leading the Pirates and all MLB rookie relievers in appearances with 73.  Most people agree that Chavez has the tools to be a very effective bullpen arm.  Chavez is the type of player the Pirates can build their organization with.  He’s not spectacular, but he’s solid with a lot of potential. 

Trading for Iwamura was folly for the Pirates and proves once again that they either don’t have a plan for the future or don’t know how to stick to the plan.  The once proud organization continues to shoot themselves in the foot.  As a Cubs fan, I’m always happy to see Pittsburgh and the Cubs’ other NL Central rivals do silly things.  As a baseball fan, it’s sad to see the Pirates make mistake after mistake.  Akinori Iwamura may make Pittsburgh a slightly better team in 2010, but acquiring him will hurt them in the long run.  And for the Pirates, the long run is where they should be focused.

**********

Last week, there were reports that said the Cubs were in talks with several teams who are interested in trading for Milton Bradley.  Fox Sports’ Ken Rosenthal reported, “Multiple teams are in contact (with) the Cubs about outfielder Milton Bradley, with one source saying, ‘You would be shocked at the level of interest.’”  George Castle disagrees.  He thinks the Cubs are going to have trouble finding even one trading partner who not only has interest in Bradley, but also has the money to take on his contract (without the Cubs paying for it) and has a decent trading chip.

I don’t always agree with Castle, but I do appreciate the way he thinks through the situation.  In this case, he has thought things through and he makes a compelling case  that the Cubs are going to have a very difficult time trading Bradley.

“Just do the math by process of elimination. ‘It only takes one,’ said a source, but it’s hard to even identify a logical landing place for Bradley and his hubris. Beyond the obvious concern over Bradley’s temper and lack of sensitivity to the next person, many in the game have pegged him as a DH, believing the Cubs took a big chance trying to play him regularly in right field.  If that’s a prevailing logic, the market for Bradley in the National League would start out very limited.”

I think it is unfair to peg Bradley as just a DH.  He played a credible right field for the Cubs and he did it without getting injured.  However, I know that what Castle says is true.  Many in the game view Bradley as a DH because the best season he has had in his 10-year career  (2008) was accomplished while DH’ing.  He only played 20 games in the outfield, compared to 106 as a DH.

Cubs fans seem to like to debate whether Bradley is the problem child he is portrayed to be, or if he is just a tempermental player (with a high OBP) who was mishandled by Lou Piniella and Jim Hendry.  I’ve made it clear that I believe Bradley is a real problem.  I have never understood the defenders of Bradley who claim he is just a convenient scapegoat for the Cubs’ problems in 2009.

But if Bradley’s advocates are right, then how do you explain the fact that so few teams have an interest in him?  How do you defend the contention that the problem was not so much Bradley, but the way Piniella/Hendry “handled” him when Bradley displayed the same type of behavior under four of the six other managers/GMs he has played for?

What the Cubs are going through right now is an indication of just how disruptive Milton Bradley is to an entire organization.  It’s not just an on-field or clubhouse problem.  His troubled personality pervades the entire organization.  The Cubs front office should be concentrating all of their efforts on improving the team for 2010.  Unfortunately, they first have to figure out how to move Bradley.  Even in the offseason, he is a distraction.

Let’s hope that the Cubs can find a trading partner who 1) doesn’t insist on the Cubs paying all/most of Bradley’s contract, and 2) has a trading chip that can make the Cubs better.  That’s asking a lot, but the Cubs were foolish enough last off season to believe that Bradley could make them better without being a problem.  Maybe there’s some other team out their that is so desperate for change that they’ll believe they can “tame” Bradley. 

Stay positive, Cubs fans.  Remember, it only takes one.

Previously, we looked at the reasons that small market/low-revenue teams might want to consider doing things differently than their competitors.  Today, I want to focus on what types of things they might consider.

One thing that has never made sense to me is the five-man pitching rotation.  Actually, it’s not so much the number of men in the rotation that confuses me, but the inherent belief in the system that all starting pitchers do their best work on five days rest.  That’s almost certainly not true, yet it is followed with almost lock-step precision by all teams. 

Why don’t teams try to switch things up a bit?  If pitcher A thrives on four days rest, pitch him more often than pitcher B who needs six days rest.  I know it won’t work out perfectly.  Pitchers will often be at their optimum rest on the same day.  If that happens, use the better pitcher.  As it stands now, pitchers are used every fifth game regardless of whether or not they have received their optimum rest.

That’s just one simple example.  Joe Posnanski offers an idea that is a little more complicated.  Again, the idea originated with Bill James:

The off-the-wall idea that maybe some team (say the Pittsburgh Pirates) simply decides that they will stop scouting and acquiring anyone who throws 90-plus mph. Just stop. You throw 95? Good for you, we’re not interested.

I will repeat: Bill (James) wasn’t saying a team should actually do this. He was saying that a team COULD do this, though. I mean, seriously, what would happen? Let’s run a little thought experiment: You’re running the Pirates. And let’s say this was true:

50% of all potential big league pitchers who throw 95 mph will be good big league pitchers.

2% of all potential big league pitchers who throw 83 mph will be good big league pitchers.

I’m sure those percentages are way skewed — no way that half the 95-mph throwers are good big league pitchers, and I have no way of knowing about the 2%. But you can fill in any number you want … the point is we say there are 100 potential pitchers who throw 95, and in this scenario 50 of them will be good pitchers. OK, well, you’re the Pittsburgh Pirates. How many of those 50 do you think you’re going to get? You are competing against 29 other teams that also want guys who can light up the radar gun. The vast majority of those 29 teams have more resources than you do, more scouts poking and prodding those prospects, more money to sign them, more clout to draw them in, more status among players and their families and their agents.

So — my guess? You’re not getting any of those 50. Zero. Oh, you might get some of the 95-mph throwers who WILL NOT be good big league pitchers. And, sure, there’s a chance you could luck into one. But it would take luck. Best bet: A big fat zero.

No, look at the other side. There is much larger pool of pitchers to pick from who top out at 83 mph, or 81 or whatever. Say there are 500 of those. By this formula, 2 percent of them could pitch effectively in the big leagues — that would be 10 pitchers (maybe you don’t believe ANY of them will be good … we’ll get to that in a second). Now, you’re the Pittsburgh Pirates — what are the chances you would get any of those 10?

Well, again, I’m guessing here: But my feeling is that if you have decided to just stop looking at the 95 mph guys and focused ALL YOUR ENERGIES on these slow-throwing guys, well, I think the chances are pretty good that you would get some, most or even all of those 10 pitchers. Why? Because, generally speaking, other teams are not investing much effort in scouting people who top out at 83. They are not scouting those players, they are not making much effort sign those players, they’re not spending draft picks on those players. They simply do not VALUE those players. if you focus all of your effort on it — and you believe in what you’re doing — you will probably figure out which of those slow-throwers has the command, quirkiness, control or movement necessary to get big leaguers out. And if you choose to value command and quirkiness and control and utterly devalue the radar gun, you should be able to corner that market.

Now, there would be people who would say this is a pointless market to corner — that 83 mph pitchers is a dry well. Maybe that’s true. But MAYBE it’s not true. Maybe you can find a cool study that suggests an 83-mph fastball down and away is just as effective a pitch as an 94-mph fastball down and away. Maybe you can point to a collection of ineffective pitchers who can throw really hard (Exhibit A: The Kansas City Royals bullpen) and conclude that speed isn’t all that compelling when it comes to getting out big league hitters. Maybe you would do the math and find that the best slow-throwers would make a better staff than one filled with bottom-third hard-throwers.

See, I just think that’s brilliant.  Would it work?  I don’t know, but that’s not the important point.  The important point is that there are a million different ways to run a baseball team, yet all teams stay within the same narrow parameters in the way they do things.  Thinking of radical, unorthadox ways to run a team is the easy part.  Well, it’s not easy, but it is easier than giving those ideas a try.  Actually taking action on the ideas is the much harder part.

Here are a few other unconventional ideas, some from Pos, some from Bill James, and some from me:

• Fill your roster with great defenders.  Don’t worry about how well they can hit.  Just make sure they are among the best defensively at their postion.
• Rather than look for starting pitchers who can routinely go six or more innings, create “teams” of pitchers that can routinely throw three strong innings and pair them up.  If a team did this, they conceivably would have to carry fewer pitchers, and the pitchers they do carry could pitch more often.
• Why do teams look for “five tool” players?  Dump the idea of the five tool player and create another, more effective way to scout players.
• Tradition says you should hit your best hitter third in the line up.  Why not take your two best hitters and hit them second and fourth? 
• Stock your roster with high OBP guys who are also outstanding base runners.  Become the strongest team in baseball at going first to third or second to home.
• Sign pitchers who don’t walk hitters.  Reward pitchers who have the lowest BB/9  in baseball.  Look for pitchers that throw the highest percentage of strikes.
• Stack your line-up with all switch hitters. 
• Bat the pitcher eighth (Tony LaRussa does this often and he’s considered a genius.  Why isn’t anyone else giving a try?)
• If shortstops are the best fielders on a team (not always true), why not put shortstops at every position?
• Why not sign pitchers who can also play another position with some proficiency?  In high school (and to a lesser extent in college), the best position players are often also the best pitchers.  Why not cultivate this instead of insisting that pitchers only pitch?
• Push the fences back at your home park and build a team based on speed and fielding.
• Develop knuckleball pitchers.  There are so few and they are so relatively underappreciated, you could corner the market.

There are many, many more possibilities, but you get the idea.  Are some of these ideas foolish?  Probably.  Are any of them fool proof?  Of course not.  But one thing is for certain: What the Royals and Pirates and Nationals, and other teams are doing is not working and will not work.  If the goal is to simply save face, then by all means, carry on.  But if these teams want a result that is different from what they are currently experiencing, then they are going to have to risk ridicule and try something different.

Cattle ranchers are among the most self-conscious individuals on the planet.  You wouldn’t think so.  After all, our perception of ranchers is that they are rugged individualists, beating their own path through life.  The truth is, most ranchers are so afraid of doing things differently than their neighbors that they will run their cattle operation into the ground before they will consider changing the way they do things.

The reason for this is that cattle ranchers watch each other.  So if you do anything different than your fellow ranchers, everyone is going to know about it.  And if what you do differently leads to failure (however failure is defined), then you’ll be the laughing stock of the cattle ranching community.

I’m picking on cattle ranchers a little bit because I’ve seen first hand how opposed many of them are to change.  They do things the way they do because it’s the way everyone else is doing it.  It’s also probably the same way their fathers did it, and their father’s fathers, and so on.

Baseball GMs are similar in this regard to cattle ranchers.  Pretty much everyone is using the same formula for success.  The problem is that every organization is different.  Each organization has its own strengths and weaknesses.  Some organizations are good at scouting.  Other have the finances to outspend their competition.  But in the end, every team looks for the same qualities in players and they try to build their organization in exactly the same way.

I have to admit, I never really thought about this until I immersed myself in the writings of Joe Posnanski.  Pos (that’s my little nickname for him) is a tremendous writer and a really smart guy.  He’s funny, self-deprecating, and he has a knack for looking at baseball from perspectives most of us never consider or even imagine.

Here’s a good example of how Pos approaches a given baseball problem:

[T]he Kansas City Royals (or a number of other teams) cannot hope to compete consistently by using the same strategies as other teams. I think we all know that the Pittsburgh Pirates have not had a winning record since 1993, which I believe is a big league record. But what I didn’t know is that the Pirates are just one of several teams in the midst of a long, long, long losing period.

Pittsburgh: Seventeen consecutive losing seasons.

Baltimore: Twelve consecutive losing seasons. (Thanks to BR DJ for reminding me … I forgot to include the Orioles in the original which is funny because Baltimore was the team that really got me thinking that there are several teams that have not won for a LONG time).

Kansas City: On pace for fifth 100-loss season in eight years — losing seasons 14 of last 15 years.

Cincinnati: Nine consecutive losing seasons, and people in Cincinnati tell me this is the worst one yet.

Milwaukee: Made the playoffs last year which was a nice story. And were 83-79 the year before that. But they had 14-consecutive seasons before that where they were .500 or worse (they were .500 once) and they have a losing record at the moment.

Washington Nationals: On pace for back-to-back 100 loss seasons, and 11 seasons leading up to where they did not win more than 83 in a season.

This is just the start.  To compete with the likes of the New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, LA Dodgers, etc., small-market and/or low-revenue teams must apply different strategies and thought processes than the teams they are competing with.

This way of thinking was triggered by a conversation (or conversations) Pos had with Bill James, King of sabermetrics and consultant with the Boston Red Sox.  Pos describes James’ opinion on the matter like this:

The feeling Bill has is that organizations can be bullied into a second class state because they want to be viewed as “professional.” They can’t win playing the game the same way as teams with more resources — repeat: They CANNOT win that way and they ARE NOT winning that way — but they cannot help but succumb to the pressures of professionalism. They don’t want to look unprofessional. That scares them more than the losing.

Sounds like the cattle ranchers, doesn’t it?

Stealing a little bit from Pos and one of his readers, Stuart, there are basically two ways organizations can approach a given situation.  Option 1 is to do what is expected of you; what is the professional thing to do; what everyone else is doing.  Win or lose, at least you won’t get laughed at.

Option 2 is to do something unconventional, knowing that even if you win, you’ll be criticized for doing things differently.  Worse yet, if you don’t succeed, you’ll be the laughing stock of your peers for stepping outside the box and doing things differently.

Pos splits out the second option in the following non-baseball example;

You’re a high school loser (or, wait, no, that was me). You could (A) not ask anyone to the prom and more or less go unnoticed, (B) ask out the most beautiful girl in school (the one you’ve had the crush on since the 5th grade) and maybe have her say yes and make you suddenly the coolest guy around or (C) ask the most beautiful girl in school and become the school punch line.

Option A in Pos’ example corresponds to our Option 1.  Option B and C are the two sides of Option 2.

Putting this into baseball terms, the given is that GMs of small market/low-revenue teams CAN NOT compete using the same strategies as larger, more financially capable teams.  Even so, most GMs insist on doing the same things as their bigger, more well-heeled bretheren.  Why?

Almost certainly, the reason goes back to Bill James assertion that these GM are trying to be “too professional.”  Surely, if they knew it would work, they would try something different (Option 2).  But because they are not assured of success, they choose to guarantee their failure while looking professional rather than taking a chance at succeeding, but looking unprofessional.

This is the premise I will be using as I move forward with this “Thinking Out Of The Box” series.  Posnanski has some more great stuff to offer, which I’ll cover tomorrow.

In an article by Phil Rogers of the Chicago Tribune, Jim Hendry is quoted as saying Joshua didn’t do anything wrong.  He said Joshua was brought in from the minors to replace Gerald Perry in June and was told it was a temporary assignment.  Hendry also told Joshua at the time that he could have his old job back if things didn’t work out.

Later in the article, Derrek Lee is quoted as saying, “I hate to say it, but a hitting coach is overrated.”  He also said that neither Perry nor Joshua were to blame.  If a player doesn’t hit, it’s the player’s fault, not the hitting coach’s.

In addition to looking for a middle-of-the-order bat and a leadoff hitter in the offseason, Hendry will now also be looking for a hitting coach.  What promises to be a busy offseason just got a little busier.

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The season isn’t quite over yet.  Both the Tigers and Twins won yesterday, so they will play a one game playoff today at the Metrodome in Minnesota.  This is the second year in a row the Twins will be playing in a one game playoff.  They lost to the White Sox last year.

-edit- The one game playoff will be held on Tuesday (10/6), not Monday (10/5).

The other teams going to the post season in the AL will be the Yankees, Angels and Red Sox.  The Yankees will await the outcome of today’s game between the Twins and Tigers and will then host the winner.  The Angels will host the Wildcard winning Red Sox to start their best-of-five series.

In the NL, the Rockies will travel to Philadelphia to take on the Phillies beginnning Wednesday afternoon.  The Dodgers will host the Cardinals at Chavez Ravine beginning Wednesday night.

I’m picking the Yankees and Red Sox to survive in the AL, while the Phillies and Cardinals will play for the pennant in the NL.  All Division Series games will be broadcast on TBS

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Alex Rodriguez entered the sixth inning of yesterday’s game against the Rays needing seven RBI to hit 100 for the season.  Time was running out and it didn’t look like he would make it.  What happened next is a new AL record.

 Rodriguez came up with two on and belted a three run homer off Rays pitcher Wade Davis.  The homerun brought him closer to the century mark in RBIs, and Rodriguez thought he might get one more at-bat in the game.  But as the Yankees continued to batter Rays pitching, that at-bat came sooner than ARod thought it might. 

The Yankees half of the sixth inning continued and Rodriguez found himself in the on deck circle when the Rays intentionally walked Mark Teixeira to load the bases.  Rodriguez then delivered his second homerun of the inning, this one a grand slam, giving him seven RBIs in the inning and a new AL record.  His second homerun of the inning was also his 30th homerun of the season, giving him seven consecutive years of 30 or more homeruns.

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I’ve advocated for a salary cap in the past on these pages.  I’m less concerned with a cap controlling a team’s spending as I am in forcing teams like the Pirates and Marlins to spend a minimum amount.  As it is, these teams are spending less on player payroll than they receive in revenue sharing.

Another concern I have with the disparity in spending is that  lower spending teams have trouble competing.  Of course, those who disagree with me point to teams like the Twins who have been at least in the hunt for the plaoffs most of the past decade.  The Marlins are another example.  Not only have they made the playoffs, but they won the World Series, beating the high spending Yankees.

As I’ve said in the past, the low spending teams making the playoffs is the exception that proves the rule.  Murray Chass disagrees with me.  In a recent article, Chass makes the assertion that there is no problem with the system as is and that it should be left alone.  To prove his point, Chass offers the following:

These are the teams, according to their rank in the salary standings, that have made the playoffs the last 10 years. This year’s lineup includes the Tigers and the Rockies, who had not clinched their spots when this was posted. (number in parentheses is the number of teams in the top 8 that were in the playoffs):

• 2009 (6): 1-4-5-6-7-8-12-17
• 2008 (4): 2-5-6-7-9-10-15-28
• 2007 (5): 1-2-5-7-8-22-23-26
• 2006 (3): 1-5-6-12-14-17-19-21
• 2005 (4): 1-2-5-6-10-12-14-16
• 2004 (5): 1-2-3-7-8-11-12-19
• 2003 (3): 1-4-6-10-11-17-23-26
• 2002 (3): 1-4-7-10-13-16-27-28
• 2001 (4): 3-5-6-8-9-12-17-26
• 2000 (3): 1-3-5-12-15-18-25-27

Chass’ point is that in almost every year, there are lower payroll teams in the playoffs.  Here’s my point: In seven of the past ten years, at least four of the top eight highest payroll teams made the playoffs.  And in every one of those 10 years, four of the top twelve spending teams qualified for the post season.  So what you have is the top spending teams claiming four playoff spots every year and the remaining 18-22 teams fighting over the remaining four spots.

I’ll be the first to admit that spending a lot of money doesn’t guarantee a team a spot in the playoffs.  Just look at the 2009 version of the Cubs.  But when money is wisely spent, the team that spends the most usually wins.